A generation of Islamic activists forced into exile also played a major role in redirecting their movements. Most leaders or members ended up spending more time in Western countries than in Islamic nations—and, notably, not in Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In the West, the Islamists came into contact with other secular and liberal dissidents as well as nongovernment organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Freedom House, that facilitated the flow of ideas. In the s, exiled activists increasingly framed their agendas in terms of democracy and human rights. Islamists have changed because society has changed too.
The rise of Islamists has reflected the social and cultural revolutions as much as a political revolution. A new generation has entered the political space, especially in the major cities. The young are better educated and more connected with the outside world than any previous generation.
Many speak or understand a foreign language. The females are often as ambitious as their male counterparts. Both genders eagerly question and debate. Most of the young are able to identify and even shrug off propaganda. The Arab baby boom generation also does not share the patriarchal culture of its elders, and the majority of baby boomers reject patronizing dictators.
Many are attracted more to ideas of good governance and freedom than to charismatic leaders. The shift does not necessarily mean that baby boomers are more liberal or more secular than their parents.
Many Arab baby boomers are attracted by new forms of religiosity that stress individual choice, direct relations with God, self-realization, and self-esteem. But even when they join Islamic movements, they bring along their critical approach and reluctance to blindly follow an aging leadership.
The transformation is visible even among young Salafis in Egypt. They may wear baggy trousers and long, white shirts, imitating the Prophet Mohammed and leading the outside world to question their willingness to modernize.
But they also often wear shiny sunglasses and sport shoes. They are part of a global culture. For decades, the Salafis opposed participation in politics. But after the uprisings, they completely reversed course. They jumped into politics, hastily registering as political parties. At universities, clubs of young Salafis—.
The influence of the current baby boom generation will be enduring. Their numbers are likely to dominate politics for much of their lives—potentially another thirty to forty years—because the fertility rate has plummeted almost everywhere in the Arab world since their birth.
Broader geostrategic changes, both global and regional, also affected the Islamist movements and ultimately prevented the religious revival from returning to rigid traditions.
In the s and s, Islamism emerged at the height of the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West. Elections and democracy came increasingly into vogue. Islamist leaders—such as Iranian revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—claimed to offer a third way between communism and capitalism.
But by the s, no country—either Sunni or Shiite—served as a beacon for Islamists. But Sunni Islamists were also critical of the royal family in Saudi Arabia, the only country where Sharia is the sole law of the land. The distrust was reciprocated. In the s, progress in the peace process also changed the political landscape.
Past versions of Occidentalism have been secular, although religion has played a role in shaping culture. Islamism is different from its predecessors in that it represents an explicitly religious Occidentalism, which fuses puritanism and political power. Such a combination is not new in Islam. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the House of Saud joined forces with the puritanical Wahhabi sect of the Nadj plateau to purify Arabia, the cradle of Islam.
Such support stands in the way of the creation and maintenance of a truly unified and pure Islamic world. The irony is that Saudi Arabia, one of the prime targets of Islamic Occidentalism, is itself the main source of that very ideology.
But hypocrisy is an unstable solution, for it has given rise to true Wahhabi believers, such as Osama bin Laden, who view the presence of American women soldiers in Arabia as an act of defilement.
To him, and his followers, it is as if the Americans were sending their temple prostitutes to defend the unmanly rulers of Saudi Arabia.
A distaste for, or even hatred of, those characteristics that we attribute to the West is in itself not a serious issue. After all, in The Laws and The Republic , Plato condemns the excesses of Athens and creates in speech a city along the lines of Sparta. Indeed, the blame falls squarely on Morsi's shoulders; he subordinated politics to religion and succumbed to the conservative and religious branch of Islamists who view political Islam as the answer to centuries of deprivation and of injustice.
He worked tirelessly to consolidate his powers while doing next to nothing to save the economy from pending collapse. He placed himself above judicial review and largely appointed fellow Brothers into key posts while allowing Brotherhood hooligans to beat up liberal opponents. If this was not enough, he undermined the core of freedom of speech by intimidating the media and failing to build democratic institutions.
Moreover, he pushed for a new constitution fully reliant on Sharia law, expanded blasphemy prosecutions, and supported discrimination against women. To be sure, Morsi surrendered to Islamic siege mentality and authoritarianism in a time when the nation was demanding inclusiveness and political freedom, which was the essence of the revolution against his predecessor in the first place. Yes, political Islam and democracy can work, but not by pushing for early elections.
A transitional government, led by a respected leader who is not shackled by a strong ideology and who can cultivate consensus and has wide public appeal, must take at least two years to allow secular and Islamic parties to develop their political platforms and make the public fully aware of their socio-economic policy and other urgent issues facing their nation.
In the interim, a new constitution should be written based on freedom, democracy and equality with separation of church and state constitutionally enshrined.
Any new constitution written in Egypt that does not clearly separate church and state will be doomed to fail, potentially ushering in yet another revolution. Brighter days will yet come to Egypt as long as Tahrir Square remains true to its name, "Liberation Square. Those who seek to lead will do well to remember that. This point will be expanded in a following article, which will model a separation of church and state in Egypt that still provides a prominent role for religion in daily life.
News U. Politics Joe Biden Congress Extremism. Special Projects Highline. HuffPost Personal Video Horoscopes. But again, can the average American explain why radical Muslims attacked the twin towers on Sept. Most likely the answer is no. According to Denison, who has lived and traveled among Muslims for some 30 years, there are two major parts to the answer.
This is then subdivided in various ways, one of which is by religion. Muslims, however, tend to see not a nation subdivided into religious groups but a religion subdivided into nations. Extremists also claim the United States attacks Islam not only by supporting Israel and with our military presence in the Middle East, but also by exporting our culture through movies, music, the Internet, and other forms of mass communication. The second major reason to the question of why radical Muslims hate America is based on their understanding of democracy.
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